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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Cet étude développe et applique des nouvelles techniques pour diagnostiquer les prévisions de 
densité  de  la  Banque  d’Angleterre  (leur  “fan  charts”).  Nous  calculons  leurs  probabilités 
implicites pour des taux d’inflation et de croissance du PIB qui dépassent des seuils critiques 
(soit le taux d’inflation ciblé, soit 2.5%.) En contraste avec des travaux antérieurs sur ces 
prévisions, nous gaugeons leur calibration aussi bien que leur résolution, en donnant des tests 
formels  et  des  interprétations  graphiques.  Les  résultats  renforcent  des  conclusions  déjà 
existant  sur  les  limites  de  ces  prévisions  et  ils  donnent  de  nouvelles  évidences  sur  leurs 
valeurs ajoutées. 
 





This paper applies new diagnostics to the Bank of England’s pioneering density forecasts (fan 
charts). We compute their implicit probability forecast for annual rates of inflation and output 
growth  that  exceed  a  given  threshold  (in  this  case,  the  target  inflation  rate  and  2.5% 
respectively.) Unlike earlier work on these forecasts, we measure both their calibration and 
their  resolution,  providing  both  formal  tests  and  graphical  interpretations  of  the  results. 
These results both reinforce earlier evidence on some of the limitations of these forecasts and 
provide new evidence on their information content. 
 
Keywords: calibration, density forecast, probability forecast, resolution. 
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Since their introduction in the 1993 Inﬂation Report, the Bank of England’s prob-
ability density forecasts (“fan charts”) for inﬂation, and later output growth, have been
studied by a number of authors. Wallis (2003) and Clements (2004) studied the inﬂa-
tion forecasts and concluded that while the current and next-quarter forecast seemed
to ﬁt well, the year-ahead forecasts signiﬁcantly overestimated the probability of high
inﬂation rates. Elder, Kapetanios, Taylor and Yates (2005) found similar results for
the inﬂation forecasts, but also found signiﬁcant evidence that the GDP forecasts do
not accurately capture the true distribution of risks to output growth at very short
horizons.1 They also explored the role of GDP revisions in accounting for GDP fore-
cast errors and noted that the dispersion associated with predicted GDP outcomes was
increased as a result of their research. Dowd (2008) examined the GDP fan charts and
found that while short-horizon forecasts appear to capture the risks to output growth
poorly, results for longer horizon forecast are sensitive to the vintage of data used to
evaluate the forecasts.
The Bank of England’s most recent performance evaluation of the fan charts was
published in their August 2009 Inﬂation Report. It noted the failure of the forecasts
made in early 2008 to assign signiﬁcant probabilities to the inﬂation and growth out-
comes witnessed over the subsequent year as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis. While not
mentioning any methodological changes made to address this experience, the Report
noted that the Bank increased the dispersion of GDP outcomes and added negative
skewness to their distribution.
Throughout this evaluative work, the focus has been on whether the risks implied
by the Bank’s fan charts are well matched (in a statistical sense) by the frequency of
the various inﬂation and output growth outcomes. Gneiting, Balabdaoui and Raftery
(2007) refer to this property as ‘probabilistic calibration’; asymptotic theory for tests
of correct calibration was provided by Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998). However, it is
well known that diﬀerent density functions may satisfy this correct calibration property
yet convey quite diﬀerent amounts of information.2 Mitchell and Wallis note that this
extra information has been referred to as ‘sharpness’, ‘reﬁnement’ or ‘resolution’ in
various contexts and note its relationship to the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion.
Although forecast sharpness or resolution is desireable, no empirical studies of the
Bank’s density forecasts have investigated this property.
One reason for this may be the diﬃculty in estimating sharpness. In general, this
requires an empirical characterization of the density of future outcomes f(x) conditional
on some density forecast g(x). Without assumptions restricting the set of density func-
tions {f(x),g(x)} to be considered, this will in general require much more data than is
1Noting the hazards of drawing ﬁrm conclusions from small samples, these authors
suggested that “the fan charts gave a reasonably good guide to the probabilities and
risks facing the MPC [monetary policy committee].”
2See Corradi and Swanson (2006) and Mitchell and Wallis (2009) for a discussion.
2typically available in typical macroeconomic settings.3 In this paper, we use an alter-
native approach which provides a practical and general solution to a simpler problem.
Instead of the full forecast density, we work with the implied probabilistic forecasts:
we compute the forecast probabilities of failing to achieve the Bank’s inﬂation target, or
for GDP growth falling below a ﬁxed threshold. (The methods that we use to do so can
of course be applied to probability forecasts for other thresholds simply by integrating
under diﬀerent regions of the density forecast; diﬀerent choices of threshold allow one
to focus on diﬀerent parts of the forecast distribution.) This is similar in spirit to
Clements’ (2004) examination of the fan chart’s implied interval forecasts.4 We are
able to investigate the calibration of the probabilistic forecasts, that is, the degree to
which predicted probabilities correspond with true probabilities of the outcome. We
are also able to evaluate their resolution: their ability to discriminate among diﬀerent
outcomes. We also build on Galbraith and van Norden (2008) by extending their tests
of forecast calibration to tests of forecast resolution.
In contrast with earlier evaluations, our results provide strong evidence of a mis-
calibration of the inﬂation forecasts at very short horizons, even though the degree of
miscalibration appears to be small. Despite the much shorter sample available for the
GDP forecasts, we again ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of mis-calibration and its magnitude
appears to be much larger than for inﬂation. Results on the discriminatory power of the
forecasts shows that inﬂation forecasts appear to have important power to distinguish
high- and low- probability cases up to horizons of about one year, while that of GDP
forecasts is much less and is almost negligible beyond a one-quarter horizon.
The next section of the paper introduces the Bank of England’s probability fore-
casts and provides an informal analysis of descriptions of the data that we use. We
then review the literature on methods for evaluating probability forecasts, introducing
the decomposition of mean-squared forecast errors into calibration errors and forecast
resolution. We brieﬂy discuss the methods introduced in Galbraith and van Norden
(2008) for tests of calibration error and their extension to tests of zero forecast resolu-
tion. The penultimate section of the paper then applies these methods to the Bank of
England data and discusses the ﬁndings. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Data and forecasts
The Bank of England’s Inﬂation Report provides probabilistic forecasts of inﬂation
and, more recently, output growth in the form of ‘fan charts’ to represent the density of
3For example, consider the problem of determining the eﬀect of variations in the right
tail of g(x) on the right tail of f(x). Only observations in which there is variation in
the relevant region of g(x) will be informative for this problem. However, since we only
observe the outcomes x rather than f(x) directly, we will need to have many of the
above observations on x in order to make inferences about the tail region of f(x).
4The Bank of England also examines such interval forecasts from time to time. For
example, see Table 1 (p. 47) of the August 2008 Inﬂation Report.
3the forecast distribution.5 Fan charts for RPIX inﬂation were published from 1993Q1 to
2004Q1, when they were replaced by CPI Inﬂation fan charts. Both measure inﬂation
as the percentage change in the corresponding price index over four quarters. The
GDP fan chart was ﬁrst published in the 1997Q3 report and also forecasts the total
percentage growth over 4 quarters. In addition to providing forecast distributions for
roughly 0 to 8 quarters into the future, from the 1998Q1 forecast onwards these are
provided conditional on the assumption of both ﬁxed interest rates, and a “market-
expectation-based” interest rate proﬁle. The two assumptions typically provide very
similar results, but we will nonetheless present most results below for both sequences
of density forecasts.
For both inﬂation and GDP growth, we use all available forecasts up to and includ-
ing that published in 2008Q2. We also measure inﬂation and output growth outcomes
using the 2008Q2 vintage data series. While a few sets of forecast densities are avail-
able at horizons exceeding eight quarters, the sample sizes involved are small. We
therefore report results for nine horizons, zero (the ’nowcast’ of the eventual current-
quarter release) through eight.6 With the four cases noted above (GDP growth and
inﬂation, assuming interest rates are constant or follow market expectations) we then
have thirty-six sets of density forecasts for evaluation.
While published charts provide a visual guide to the degree of uncertainty that
the Bank of England (BoE) Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) associate with their
forecasts, they are based on an explicit parametric model of forecast uncertainty, as
documented by Brittan, Fisher and Whitley (1998) and Wallis (2003), among others.
Forecast errors are assumed to follow a ‘two-piece normal’ or ‘bi-normal’ distribution,
whose behaviour is completely characterized by three parameters: a mean µ, a mea-
sure of dispersion σ, and a parameter which controls skewness, γ.7 These parameters
therefore allow us to estimate the implied forecast probabilities that inﬂation or GDP
growth would exceed any given threshold level.8 For GDP forecasts, we examine the
probability that annual real growth is less than 2.5%, while for inﬂation we examine
5See Wallis (1999) for a careful discussion of the interpretation of these charts; note in
particular that the diﬀerent bands do not correspond straightforwardly with quantiles
in the general, asymmetric, case.
6The ﬁgures below also show some estimates based on longer horizons, although the
sample sizes available are small.
7See Wallis (2003, Box A on p. 66) for a description of the bi-normal distribution and
its alternative parameterizations. Spreadsheets containing the parameter settings for
all of the published fan charts are publicly available on the BoE’s web site (presently at
http://www. bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inﬂationreport/irprobab.htm). Note
that in the latter part of our sample, γ is commonly set to 0, in which case the implied
forecast distribution is simply Gaussian.
8Like the normal distribution, the bi-normal lacks an exact closed-form formula for its
cumulative distribution function (CDF). When γ 6= 0, we therefore estimated the im-
4the probability that it does not exceed the Bank’s announced inﬂation target.
2.1 Density forecasts
Figures 1 and 2 plot the results of the probability integral transforms for each
of the sets of forecasts. As these are U(0,1) under the null of correct speciﬁcation of
the conditional density, the histograms should show roughly the same proportion of
observed forecasts in each of the ten cells. In order to represent the results for nine
forecast horizons (0–8 inclusive) in each ﬁgure, we have indicated the height of each
histogram with a colour coding; each row of the ﬁgure represents a diﬀerent horizon,
and each column a particular bin with width 0.1. Uniformly distributed results would
imply a frequency of 0.1 in each bin, and therefore a uniform colour in the ﬁgure. Values
well below 0.1 show up as dark blue, and well above 0.1 as red.
While some sampling variation is of course inevitable, these patterns are in general
far from conformity with this condition. GDP growth forecasts (Figure 1) often show an
excessive number of values in the highest cell (near 1) at short horizons, an insuﬃcient
number at long horizons, and an insuﬃcient number of values near zero at virtually
all horizons. Inﬂation forecasts (Figure 2) show better conformity with the desired
pattern of uniformity, but some of the same tendency is observable. Note that an
insuﬃcient number of values of the probability integral transform near the extremes is
an indication of forecast densities that are too dispersed: actual outcomes occur near
the tail of the forecast density less often than would arise with the true conditional
density, and therefore observed outcomes tend to be in intermediate regions of the
relevant CDF.
2.2 Threshold probability forecasts
Figures 3 and 4 show the implications of the BoE’s density forecasts for the prob-
abilities that real GDP is less than the 2.5% threshold we mentioned above and that
inﬂation (based on RPIX or CPI) is less than the Bank’s target. Each point corresponds
to the probability (on the vertical axis) that inﬂation or output growth would be less
than the chosen threshold at the given forecast horizon (given on the horizontal axis.)
The larger (green) dots represent cases in which the eventual outcome was below the
relevant threshold, while the smaller (blue) dots are cases in which the outcome was
above threshold.
Ideal forecasts would have assigned probability one to all the large green dots and
probability zero to the smaller blue dots. Instead, for GDP growth we observe several
high probability blue dots and low probability green dots (see horizons 2-4 in particular)
which indicate “surprises.” We also ﬁnd most outcomes clustered in the center of the
probability range at horizons 4-8. The probabilistic outcomes for inﬂation show similar
plied forecast probabilities by numerical integration from probability density function.
The resulting CDF estimates appeared to be accurate to at least 0.001. When γ = 0
the normal CDF was used. Additional details and code are available from the authors
upon request.
5features with respect to changes across horizons, but at the shorter horizons we see a
more marked concentration of large green dots at the higher probabilities and small
blue dots at the lower, suggesting that the inﬂation forecasts had more discriminatory
power than the GDP forecasts, at least at the short horizons.
While the results in the graph presented this far are suggestive, we would like to
be able to test for systematic problems in the probability forecasts and their ability
to discriminate between diﬀerent outcomes. In the next section, we review some of
the literature on density forecast evaluation before focusing on tests of probabilistic
forecasts and properties of forecast calibration and resolution.
3. Probability forecast evaluation
3.1 Predictive density evaluation
Let X be a random variable with realizations xt and with probability density and
cumulative distribution functions fX(x) and FX(x) respectively. Then for a given sam-
ple {xt}T
t=1, the corresponding sample of values of the CDF, {FX(xt)}T
t=1, is a U(0,1)
sequence. This well-known result (often termed the probability integral transform of
{xt}T
t=1) is the basis of much predictive density testing, following pioneering work by
Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998).
These authors noted that if the predictive density ˆ fX(x) is equal to the true den-
sity, then using the predictive density for the probability integral transform should
produce the same result, i.e. a U(0,1) sequence. This allows us to test whether a given
sequence of forecast densities could be equal to the true sequence by checking whether
{ ˆ FX(xt)}T
t=1 (i.e. the sequence of CDFs of the realized values using the forecast densi-
ties) is U(0,1). This is precisely the relationship that we looked for in Figures 1 and 2,
above.
If this sequence is assumed to be independent, the U(0,1) condition is easily tested
with standard tests (such as a Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test.) The indepen-
dence is unrealistic in many economic applications, however. In particular, violation is
almost certain for multiple-horizon forecasts as the h − 1 period overlap in horizon-h
forecasts induces an MA(h − 1) process in the forecast errors. The inferential prob-
lem is therefore more diﬃcult: test statistic distributions are aﬀected by the form of
dependence.
3.2 Probabilistic forecasts
Rather than analyse the entire predictive density, we instead examine the proba-
bilistic forecasts implied by the BoE forecasts; that is, we only consider the probability
that an outcome (inﬂation or output growth) will be below some threshold. This implies
a loss of information relative to the full density forecast. Of course, if we are primarily
concerned with the behaviour of our forecasts around these thresholds, this loss of eﬃ-
ciency may be inconsequential. This seems to be the case for the BoE forecasts and the
6thresholds we have chosen; considerable attention is devoted to questions of whether or
not central banks will respect their inﬂation targets, and whether output growth will be
slightly above or below its mean.9 As we show now, probabilistic forecasts also permit
a particularly simple decomposition that is useful for interpreting forecast behaviour
and the sources of forecast errors.
Following the notation of Murphy and Winkler (1987), let x be a 0/1 binary
variable representing an outcome and let ˆ p ∈ [0,1] be a probability forecast of that
outcome. Forecasts and outcomes may both be seen as random variables, and therefore
as having a joint distribution; see e.g. Murphy (1973), from which much subsequent
work follows.
Numerous summary measures of probabilistic forecast performance have been sug-
gested, including loss functions such as the Brier score (Brier, 1950) which is a MSE
criterion. Since the variance of the binary outcomes is ﬁxed, it is useful to condition
on the forecasts: in this case we can express the mean squared error E((ˆ p−x)2) of the
probabilistic forecast as follows:10
E(ˆ p − x)2 = E(x − E(x))2 + Ef(ˆ p − E(x|ˆ p))2 − Ef(E(x|ˆ p) − E(x))2, (3.1)
where Ef(z) =
R
zf(z)dz with f(.) the marginal distribution of the forecasts,
ˆ p. Note that the ﬁrst right-hand side term, the variance of the binary sequence of
outcomes, is a ﬁxed feature of the problem and does not depend on the forecasts.
Hence all information in the MSE that depends on the forecasts is contained in the
second and third terms on the right-hand side of (3.1).
3.3 Calibration and resolution
We will call the ﬁrst of the terms involving ˆ p in (3.1),
Ef(ˆ p − E(x|ˆ p))2, (3.2)
9Particularly in light of recent events, some might argue that central banks should be
more attentive to the possibility of extreme drops in output growth. We note that
the methods that we use below can in principle be applied to this question as well by
simply choosing a diﬀerent threshold level of output growth. Given the relative short
sample over which the GDP growth forecasts are available, however, it is presumably
diﬃcult to say much about the probability of a downturn as severe as that witnessed
in late 2008 with what is essentially a single realization.
10The MSE is of course only one of many possible loss functions, and is inappropri-
ate in some circumstances. We focus on it here because there is no concensus on the
precise form of an appropriate loss function for an inﬂation-targetting central and be-
cause we argue that the decomposition it presents is helpful in understanding forecast
performance.
7the (mean squared) calibration error: it measures the deviation from a perfect match
between the predicted probability and the true probability of the event when a given
forecast is made.11 If for any forecast value ˆ pi the true probability that the event will
occur is also ˆ pi, then the forecasts are perfectly calibrated. If for example we forecast
that the probability of a recession beginning in the next quarter is 20%, and if over all
occasions on which we would make this forecast the proportion in which a recession will
begin is 20%, and if this match holds for all other possible predicted probabilities, then
the forecasts are perfectly calibrated. Note that perfect calibration can be achieved by
setting ˆ p = E(x), the unconditional probability of a recession, since the expectation is
taken over the possible values or range of values that the probability forecast can take
on.
Calibration has typically been investigated using histogram-type estimates of the
conditional expectation, grouping probabilities into cells. Galbraith and van Norden
(2008) show how to use smooth conditional expectation functions estimated via kernel
methods to estimate calibration functions and test for miscalibration. They show that
this allows one to correct for the dependence caused by overlapping forecast windows
and leads to an eﬃciency relative to histogram methods even in the absence of de-
pendence. We use these methods (described in detail in that paper) below to further
examine the performance of the BoE inﬂation and growth forecasts.
The last term on the right-hand side of (3.1), Ef(E(x|ˆ p) − E(x))2, is called the
forecast resolution, and measures the ability of forecasts to distinguish among relatively
high-probability and relatively low-probability cases. Note again that the expectation
is taken with respect to the marginal distribution of the forecasts. If resolution is high,
then in typical cases the conditional expectation of the outcome diﬀers substantially
from its unconditional mean: the forecasts are successfully identifying cases in which
probability of the event is unusually high or low. The resolution enters negatively
into the MSE decomposition; high resolution lowers MSE. To return to the previous
example, the simple forecast that always predicts a 5% probability of recession, where
5% is the unconditional probability, will have zero resolution. Perfect forecasts would
have resolution equal to variance (and zero calibration error, so that MSE = 0). In this
special case, the probability forecasts are always 1 when the outcome will be below the
threshold, and are 0 otherwise.
The calibration error has a minimum value of zero; its maximum value is 1, where
forecasts and conditional expectations are perfectly opposed. The resolution also has a
minimum value of zero, but its maximum value is equal to the variance of the binary
outcome process. In order to report a more readily interpretable measure, scaled into
[0,1], we divide the resolution by the variance of the binary outcome process. Let
11This quantity is often called simply the ‘calibration’ or ‘reliability’ of the forecasts. We
prefer the term calibration error to emphasize that this quantity measures deviations
from the ideal forecast, and we will use ‘calibration’ to refer to the general property of
conformity between predicted and true conditional probabilities.
8n be the number of observed forecasts and µ = E(x); then the maximum resolution
achievable arises where there are nµ 1’s and n−nµ 0’s constituting the sequence E(x|ˆ p)i.
The resulting maximum total is nµ(1 − µ)2 + n(1 − µ)µ2. Divide by n for the mean;
this quantity is then the maximum resolution and is also equal to the variance of a 0/1
random variable with mean µ. Therefore
Ef(E(x|ˆ p) − µ)2
µ(1 − µ)2 + (1 − µ)µ2 ∈ [0,1]. (3.3)
The information in the resolution is correlated with that in the calibration; the
decomposition just given is not an orthogonal one (see for example Yates and Curley
1985). However the resolution also has useful interpretive value which we will see below
in considering the empirical results. The calibration and/or resolution of probabilistic
economic forecasts have been investigated by a number of authors, including Diebold
and Rudebusch (1989), Galbraith and van Norden (2007), and Lahiri and Wang (2007).
The meteorological and statistical literatures contain many more examples; some recent
contributions include Hamill et al. (2003) and Gneiting et al. (2007). We now use these
methods to examine the BoE forecasts.
4. Empirical results
Figures 5 and 6 plot the estimated conditional expectation of outcome given fore-
cast, which for correctly calibrated forecasts would lie along the line E(x|ˆ p) = ˆ p, i.e.
the 45 degree line. Again, see Galbraith and van Norden (2008) for a description of
the methods used to construct these estimates, including bandwidth choice; all results
depicted here use bandwidth 0.08.
Figure 5 shows these conditional expectations for the GDP growth forecasts at each
forecast horizon. Deviations from perfect calibration (the 45-degree line) are widespread
and often large. Most strikingly, high predicted probabilities of growth falling below
threshold correspond to low observed frequencies of this outcome for virtually all hori-
zons. Calibration is much more reasonable for probabilities in the 0-0.5 range, but falls
dramatically beyond predicted probabilities of around 0.8. Calibration for the small
sample of very long horizon forecasts appears very poor, with a strongly negative slope
everywhere. In contrast, calibration of the inﬂation forecasts appears more reason-
able at all predicted probabilities, even for the small sample of longer-horizon forecasts
available in the market interest rate case. The corresponding numerical mean squared
calibration errors are presented in Table 1.
One problem in interpreting these graphs and numerical estimates is that the
precision of the estimated conditional expectations may vary widely across the graph.
This makes it diﬃcult to judge whether any of the deviations from the 45 degree are
statistically signiﬁcant. For that, we turn to formal tests of the null hypothesis of
correct calibration (that is, E(x|ˆ p) = ˆ p) given in Table 2. At short horizons, correct
calibration is decisively rejected for both GDP growth and inﬂation forecasts. At longer
9horizons the results are mixed, with diﬀerences emerging between the ﬁxed interest rate
and market interest rate forecasts. Despite the apparently dramatic mis-calibration
visible in the ﬁgures for GDP forecasts, we are often unable to reject the null of correct
calibration for the market-interest-rate forecasts. This may be related to the relatively
small number of sample points lying at high forecast probabilities, which would give
the test low power to detect such deviation. Alternatively, it could be due to the highly
non-linear evidence of miscalibration shown in the graphs. Our test is based on a
linear alternative hypothesis and so may have reduced power against some non-linear
alternatives. In contrast, the graphs for inﬂation showed that the forecast calibration
was much more nearly linear, which should give our tests higher power. This may
therefore explain the relative high number of rejections of the null despite the relatively
better ﬁt shown in the inﬂation graphs.
Figures 5 and 6 also provide us with information on the resolution of the BoE
forecasts. A forecast with zero resolution will have a constant E(x|p), so the conditional
expectation should simply be a horizontal line. While it is conceivable that some of the
results for the GDP growth forecasts shown in Figure 5 could be consistent with such an
outcome (such as the results for the constant interest rate forecasts at 6-8Q horizons)
this appears much less likely for the inﬂation forecasts, which all show a persistently
positive slope.
Figures 7 and 8 provide another way of understanding the resolution of the prob-
ability forecasts which does not require estimation of the conditional expectation. For
each horizon (only horizons up to four quarters are shown), each ﬁgure presents a pair of
empirical CDF’s: that of probability forecasts in cases for which the eventual outcome
was below threshold, and in cases in which the eventual outcome was above threshold.
In a near-ideal world, probability forecasts should be near one in cases where the out-
come turned out to be below threshold, and near zero when the outcome turned out
to be above. In that case the two CDF’s would lie close to the lower horizontal axis
in the ﬁrst case, and close to the upper horizontal axis in the second. More generally,
good probability forecasts will discriminate eﬀectively between the two possible out-
comes, and the two empirical CDF’s should be widely separated. At longer horizons,
the value of conditioning information declines and this separation becomes more diﬃ-
cult to achieve; we therefore expect to see the pairs of CDF’s less widely separated at
longer horizons.
This pattern of reduced separation with horizon is in fact readily observable; at
3-4 quarter horizons, we observe little separation on either forecast series. However, at
shorter horizons, we observe a clear distinction between the GDP growth and inﬂation
forecasts; separation is much greater in the inﬂation forecast case (Figure 8, both panels;
there is little observable distinction between the ﬁxed and market interest rate cases),
suggesting much higher forecast resolution. GDP growth forecasts (Figure 7) in fact
show little separation of the CDF’s after the shortest horizons.12 However, for GDP
forecasts there is some observable distinction between the ﬁxed and market interest
12This result which mirrors the low ‘content horizon’ on U.S. and Canadian GDP
10rate cases; the ﬁxed cases show somewhat higher resolution in at short horizons.
These diﬀerences are conﬁrmed by the numerical results on scaled resolution pre-
sented in Table 3. Scaled resolution (recall that this estimate is bounded to the [0,1]
interval) in GDP growth forecasts is low even at short horizons, and approximately
zero at moderate and long horizons; by contrast, inﬂation forecasts show substantial
resolution for several quarters. The market-interest-rate forecast for inﬂation shows the
highest resolution.
The test results for the null hypothesis of zero resolution (Table 4) are again
compatible with these observations. These are simple t− type tests of H0 : b = 0 in
E(x|ˆ p) = a + bˆ p; robust (Newey-West) standard errors are used in the computation.
Table 4 reports p-values from the asymptotic normal distribution applying to these test
statistics. For inﬂation forecasts, there is strong evidence against the null in all but one
(horizon 8) case, whereas for GDP forecasts we typically cannot reject zero resolution
(the shortest-horizon ﬁxed-interest forecasts provide the only exception). These results
also reﬂect other results in the literature mentioned above, which note the diﬃculty
of the GDP growth forecasting problem and the associated low information content of
such forecasts, by various measures, relative to inﬂation forecasts.
6. Concluding remarks
By focusing our attention on particular probabilities derived from the fan charts,
we have evaluated the performance of these density forecasts in problems of the type
likely to be of interest to forecast users, as opposed to a general evaluation of whether
the fan charts represent correct conditional densities; it is of course possible that a
forecast density diﬀers in some respects from the conditional density while nonetheless
producing probability forecasts with some valuable features.
A number of interesting empirical results emerge. First, it is apparent even from
the preliminary graphical results presented here that the predicted densities do not
entirely conform with the true conditional densities. We then map these densities onto
particular probabilistic forecasts for evaluation of the calibration and resolution. For
inﬂation forecasts, deviations from correct calibration appear to be small, although
nonetheless statistically signiﬁcant at a number of forecast horizons. GDP growth
forecasts produce much larger estimated deviations from correct calibration: that is,
predicted probabilities of GDP falling below our threshold are in many cases far from
growth point forecasts reported by, for example, Galbraith 2003 and Galbraith and
Tkacz 2007: that is, forecasts of GDP growth generally do not improve markedly
on the simple unconditional mean beyond about one or two quarters into the future.
Galbraith and van Norden (2008) estimate conditional expectation functions for the
Survey of Professional Forecasters probabilistic forecasts for US real output contractions
using methods very similar to those used here. They ﬁnd forecasts are appear to be
essentially unconditional forecasts at horizons of more than 2Q, which implies zero
forecast resolution.
11our estimates of the true conditional probabilities. However, only a subset of the
observed deviations are statistically signiﬁcant, perhaps because of the limited sample
size.
Resolution falls rapidly with forecast horizon, is higher for inﬂation forecasts, and
for GDP is in most cases diﬃcult to distinguish statistically from zero.
These results, particularly at longer horizons, reﬂect diﬀerences in inﬂation and
GDP growth observed in other contexts: the usefulness of conditioning information
allowing us to make forecasts appears to decay much more quickly for GDP growth,
and the persistence in the data is much lower. Whether suﬃcient information exists to
produce forecast densities for GDP growth which diﬀer from the unconditional densities,
at the longer horizons used by the Bank of England, is an open question.
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13Figure 1(i)
Probability integral transforms13


































13In each of the panels of ﬁgure 1 and 2, the ten columns of squares represent the bins
0–0.1, 0.1–0.2, ... 0.9–1.0 and the nine rows of squares represent the horizons 0-8. Each
square represents, via colour, the height of a histogram corresponding with the horizon
and bin. Ideally, the probability integral transforms would yield a U(0,1) sequence, so











































































































14Note that the colour scale diﬀers substantially in Figure 2(ii); large values are less
extreme than in previous ﬁgures.
17Figure 3
Implied probability forecasts from Bank of England fan charts
(i) GDP growth vs. threshold; ﬁxed interest rates
(ii) GDP growth vs. threshold; market interest rates
18Figure 4
Implied probability forecasts from Bank of England fan charts
(i) Inﬂation vs. threshold; ﬁxed interest rates
(ii) Inﬂation vs. threshold; market interest rates
19Figure 5
Calibration of GDP growth forecasts, 2.5% threshold
(i) 2008 Q2 vintage data, ﬁxed interest rates
(ii) 2008 Q2 vintage data, market interest rates
20Figure 6
Calibration of inﬂation forecasts, target threshold
(i) 2008 Q2 vintage data, ﬁxed interest rates
(ii) 2008 Q2 vintage data, market interest rates
21Figure 7
Empirical CDF’s of implied probability forecasts from fan charts
Cases of GDP growth above/below threshold
(i) ﬁxed interest rates
(ii) market interest rates
22Figure 8
Empirical CDF’s of implied probability forecasts from fan charts
Cases of inﬂation above/below threshold
(i) ﬁxed interest rates
(ii) market interest rates
23Table 1
Mean squared calibration errors
Horizon GDP, ﬁxed GDP, market Inﬂ., ﬁxed Inﬂ., market
0 0.066 0.127 0.008 0.009
1 0.071 0.088 0.015 0.012
2 0.107 0.085 0.017 0.014
3 0.134 0.127 0.017 0.014
4 0.151 0.106 0.020 0.018
5 0.124 0.059 0.018 0.017
6 0.069 0.039 0.013 0.011
7 0.052 0.033 0.005 0.006
8 0.045 0.026 0.002 0.008
Table 2
p-values in linear test of calibration15
H0 : a = 0, b = 1 in E(x|ˆ p) = a + bˆ p
Horizon GDP, ﬁxed GDP, market Inﬂ., ﬁxed Inﬂ., market
0 0.046 0.00 0.01 0.02
1 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
2 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
3 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.06
4 0.00 0.17 0.36 0.28
5 0.00 0.30 0.41 0.31
6 0.01 0.33 0.32 0.09
7 0.11 0.40 0.58 0.00
8 0.25 0.43 0.96 0.00
15A reported value of 0.00 in Table 2 indicates a computed p-value less than 0.005.
24Table 3
scaled resolution measure (∈ [0,1])
Horizon GDP, ﬁxed GDP, market Inﬂ., ﬁxed Inﬂ., market
0 0.19 0.05 0.80 0.79
1 0.16 0.09 0.60 0.63
2 0.16 0.11 0.50 0.53
3 0.12 0.19 0.35 0.37
4 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.25
5 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.21
6 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.21
7 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.14
8 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13
Table 4
p-values in linear test of zero resolution16
H0 : b = 0 in E(x|ˆ p) = a + bˆ p
Horizon GDP, ﬁxed GDP, market Inﬂ., ﬁxed Inﬂ., market
0 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.00
1 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.00
2 0.34 0.32 0.00 0.00
3 0.97 0.60 0.00 0.00
4 0.62 0.76 0.00 0.00
5 0.45 0.78 0.00 0.00
6 0.50 0.72 0.00 0.00
7 0.72 0.68 0.00 0.00
8 0.84 0.67 0.13 0.00
16A reported value of 0.00 in Table 4 indicates a computed p-value less than 0.005.
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